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Control of Foundations and Other
Non-Profit Corporations
Seth Taft*
P OVERTY PROGRAMS, HOUSING PROJECTS, a new school, a golf course-
every new group activity seems to call for a new non-profit corpo-
ration. And hardly a day goes by without a new foundation appearing on
the scene. Why? Protection against potential liabilities. Perpetuation of
support for one's interests. Tax benefits. A requirement to obtain
financing. An entity to receive and administer a grant. Ease of using
well established procedures. For whatever reason, it's done every day.
In Ohio alone, last year, 1,773 non-profit corporations were formed.
Too little attention is given to the matter of control of foundations
and other non-profit corporations by those involved in forming them.
A review of the subject seems justified, in advance.
Though a foundation is occasionally a charitable trust rather than
a corporation (The Cleveland Foundation, for example, is a group of
separate charitable trusts each of which assigns the job of making grants
to the same Distribution Committee); most are non-profit corporations.
Besides, the greater part of the comments in this article apply as well
to charitable trusts as to non-profit corporations.
Picking the first board of trustees (or executive committee) and
officers may seem a simple matter. The more difficult problem lies in
"ultimate" or continuing control. The simple answer that ultimate con-
trol lies in the hands of the "members" is no longer adequate, if it ever
was. For an increasing number of corporations the planners don't start
with members-they start with a project sponsored by another organ-
ization or by some small group. Establishing who will be the "members"
is just one of many problems to be solved.
The first question facing the planners of a non-profit corporation is
the composition of the initial board of trustees. Here control is first
established. The only item of substance required in the articles of in-
corporation of an Ohio non-profit corporation, after name and purpose,
is the names of the initial trustees. So who shall they be? Is it as
simple as it first appeared?
Size is a crucial element. In general, the larger a board of trustees
the more concentrated will control become. The chairman of a three-
man board, such as the Cuyahoga County Board of County Commission-
ers, is weak by comparison with the chairman of a 1,000-person group
such as the central committee of a political party. Size will also affect
participation. The larger a board the less will be individual participa-
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tion. For years The Cleveland Foundation Distribution Committee of
five averaged 80% or better attendance at meetings. A fifteen-man
board will be lucky to hit two-thirds attendance, and a thirty-man
board will almost invariably have to set its quorum at less than a
majority in order to hold a valid meeting. Any size larger than about
twelve to fifteen makes regular operation through an executive commit-
tee almost inevitable. C. Northcote Parkinson set the ideal number for
a working group at eight, more or less." My own observation supports
Parkinson's "Law."
Frequently boards will gradually grow as those in command feel
that more and more interests should be represented on a board, "in-
volved" in the work of the organization. The motive may be laudable
and the result may be more support, financial and otherwise, and a bet-
ter sounding board for opinion-but power will almost surely thereby
shift to a small group. The Greater Cleveland Growth Board grew from
25 to 36 in its six-year life; its steering committee became more and
more important. The board of the Cleveland Council on World Affairs
was very much enlarged a few years ago to more than fifty; the Execu-
tive Committee now does the work.
There is no perfect size for a board of trustees, but those who set or
change the size should be aware of the consequences.
The overall character of a board of trustees can greatly affect the
ability of a non-profit corporation to carry out its objectives. Those who
have power and a common interest may join together to exercise that
power collectively. The Cleveland Development Foundation was formed
by Cleveland industry and run by an industry board and executive
committee. Chambers of commerce are similarly organized. Unity of
point of view makes for quick decisions when needed, but can also
create such reactions in "outsiders" that results may be harder to
achieve.
In some organizations those with power pick experts to serve on a
board to carry out some objective on which those with power have
agreed. Here there will never be a major decision without checking
back with the bosses. In other organizations a board will represent
those interested in an objective other than those who directly par-
ticipate. Typical might be the Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Author-
ity, creating and managing housing for the poor; it is broadly rep-
resentative. Decisions have a greater chance of acceptance by the
community because they will have been arrived at by representatives
of more interests. The process can take longer, however, and may even
delay action so long that the organization is powerless.
More recently, led by the national Poverty Program, those who
participate are serving on boards of trustees. Students demand a vote
on faculty appointments. A new dimension is added. The deciders are
1 C. Northcote Parkinson, Parkinson's Law 33-34 (1957).
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now far more aware of the complications of any decision, but decision
is tougher. As a control group becomes less cohesive and more repre-
sentative, it has greater and greater difficulty in making decisions and
mobilizing to carry them out. Participants will look more to immediate
effects of action than to long-range effects. Those who plan a new
organization had better recognize these differing consequences or they
may be severely disappointed in reaching their basic goal.
Composition of a board of trustees may depend on the new cor-
poration's relation to another organization. Frequently there are special
reasons for an organization to form a new corporation. A housing
project 'financed by the Federal Housing Administration may have to
be put in a corporation having no other business. An activity may in-
volve possible liabilities that the parent organization wants to avoid.
And, quite regularly, a trade association or business will have a related
charitable foundation. Thus, the Cleveland Bar Association has the
Cleveland Bar Foundation. The Greater Cleveland Growth Association
in 1968 took on such a relationship to the Cleveland Development
Foundation.
Since non-profit corporations don't issue stock, other devices are
necessary to form what business men would call a "subsidiary." An
easy way is simply to provide that the board of the parent corporation
shall ex officio constitute the membership of the subsidiary corporation.
For example, the board of directors of The Cleveland Chamber of Com-
merce constituted the membership of the Greater Cleveland Growth
Board and elected the latter's board of trustees. It is also possible to
provide that one or more trustees (perhaps a majority) shall be desig-
nated by the parent organization. So it is that Case Western Reserve
University may name certain of the trustees of the University Circle
Development Foundation. Another practice is to form a corporation
without members, or with members the same as the board of trustees,
whose board therefore elects its own successors; a policy is then estab-
lished to keep the membership of the board identical to the board or
executive committee of the parent organization. In this way the Long-
wood and Garden Valley Housing Associations, owners of the Cleveland
housing projects of the same name, have maintained their affiliation with
the Cleveland Development Foundation.
Maintaining an identity in the bodies in working control appears
to be more effective in ensuring complementary activities than the right
to choose trustees. It takes a while to exercise control through the
power to appoint. Firing a board (if the parent group has the power)
is frequently too drastic a control mechanism. Waiting until election
may involve harmful delay and still not avoid an embarrassing fight;
typically an outgoing board, directly or through a nominating committee
appointed by it, proposes its own successors. In Gleveland the Greater
Cleveland Growth Board, with a separate budget of $250,000 per year
Sept. 1969
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raised by its Executive Committee, did not consider itself subservient
to the Chamber of Commerce despite the latter's right to elect the board
of trustees. The Chamber invariably elected those nominated by the
Growth Board.
Term of office can be an important element of control. The longer
a term the less the control. Many organizations classify their boards
and elect only one-third at a time, for example, for overlapping three-
year terms. Delay in effecting control is inevitable. From the opposite
standpoint, however, continuity of control is made easier, for a new
group seeking control can go after only one class at a time. Thus we
see one business corporation after another, in the face of possible raid,
classifying its board. The same incentive exists in non-profit corpora-
tions. Whether continuity is desirable, of course, depends on whether
one is looking from the inside out or from the outside in.
Age limits have a visible effect upon control. There is an increasing
tendency in both profit and non-profit corporations to put age limits
upon trustee or director terms. Apart from the myriad arguments on
both sides of this issue, age limits add to the problems of maintaining
continuity of control. Frequently a key individual is dominant in main-
taining continuity and an organization will fall apart on his departure at
a particular time. On the other hand, compulsory retirement forces the
control group to work out a transition to the next generation of man-
agers at an earlier time. Though I concur in the principle of transfer of
control to a younger group before a whole generation of thinking is
skipped (often with terrible consequences to the organization), an in-
flexible retirement policy has significant dangers for an organization.
It is not hard to think of illustrations of the dilemma of age limits.
Franklin D. Roosevelt in his fourth term as President, Conrad Adenauer
leading West Germany at 88, Winston Churchill in his last years as
Prime Minister of England, J. Edgar Hoover as the ageless chief of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Frances Bolton as an 80-year-old
Congressman from the Cleveland area, Chiang Kai Shek preserving a
myth that the island of Taiwan is "China"-who is to say for sure
whether age limits should have retired these people earlier? In each
case they represented continuity and leadership, frequently in times of
crisis. They also prove that age limits affect control. Continuity occurs,
sometimes at the expense of later more complete shifts of control.
So much for board of trustee composition. My purpose is not to
establish an ideal, but to help those who plan to plan more effectively.
Boards of trustees are chosen in a number of different ways, speak-
ing technically. A board may be set up with ex officio members only,
such as a business corporation's affiliated charitable foundation where
every member of the business board is automatically a member of the
charitable board. Result: the charitable corporation is the alter ego of
the profit corporation. The chairman says to his staff man:
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"All right, John, which hat do we have on for this action?" Control
is simple, complete and quick-acting.
Then there's the self-perpetuating board. Many educational institu-
tions, Yale, Harvard and Vassar included, for example, have boards
where a majority of the board is chosen by the board itself. This pro-
cedure is also used conveniently to maintain identity of management
with a parent organization. It is appropriate where an organization is
expected to have a limited life, as with the Greater Cleveland Associated
Foundation, established as a ten-year undertaking by the Ford Founda-
tion and the Leonard C. Hanna, Jr. Fund; most of the initial board is
expected to be on hand for the full life of the undertaking. When used
for an independent, continuing organization like a university, one has
created a body subject to no controls (except compliance with legal
limitations). It is a marvel that we see so few "run-away" boards under
these circumstances. The technique is the result, I believe, of not know-
ing who should elect the board. Alumni? Students? Faculty? Some
public official like a Governor, as with a state university? Each has its
drawbacks. So the planner gives up and hopes for the best.
Sometimes a board is chosen by specified office-holders. For fifty
years a majority of the committee distributing funds of The Cleveland
Foundation, in the millions of dollars per year, were appointed, sep-
arately, by the Mayor of Cleveland, the senior Federal District Judge
and the senior Probate Judge. This does not produce control in anyone
when no appointing authority chooses a majority, but it does make for
some influence over policy.
Membership has not figured in this discussion so far. There are
many genuine membership organizations, like labor unions, political
clubs, country clubs, fraternal lodges, trade and professional associations.
The members are intended to be in ultimate control. Control at any
one time is the result of the manner of nomination and election of officers
and trustees. Most simply, the board or executive committee acts as
nominating committee and proposes a slate at an annual meeting of
members. Only rarely is there opposition to the management slate.
Continuity is assured.
Some seek to increase the responsiveness of boards to their mem-
bership, others (by contrast) to preserve continuity. "Continuity" is
assisted by mail balloting (insurgents cannot then pack an election
meeting) or requiring that additional nominations be made by petition
well in advance of the election (no late rushes). A secret ballot is
ordinarily treated as a right, but one could probably set up an organ-
ization without it.2 Public voting makes dissent noticeably more diffi-
cult. Arid the very requirement of a nomination at least guarantees the
control group against surprise. If nominations are not required, an in-
2 Robert's Rules of Order 193-196 (75th Anniv. ed. 1965).
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surgent group can quietly organize, pack a meeting, vote for their
candidate and elect him, before the predominant group is hardly aware
an election has been held. Fairness, I believe, requires both a secret
ballot and nominations.
Frequently an organization will deliberately seek diversity, or "re-
sponsiveness." The City Club of Cleveland conscientiously nominates
twice the number of directors as there are places to be filled. Suddenly
there is both interest and excitement-a benefit to any organization.
The only drawback is the occasional inability to get on the board some
important person who just can't win an election. The Yale Law School
Association, for example, has some positions filled by contested election
and some by appointment or single-slate election.
Choice of board of trustees is not the only factor in control of foun-
dations and other non-profit corporations. In many organizations, such
as the Cleveland Development Foundation and the Cleveland Council on
World Affairs, the executive committee of the board of trustees is in fact
the active management group, and the board of trustees seldom meets
and even less often does anything except act on recommendation of the
executive committee. The relationship of the executive committee to
the board of trustees becomes much like the relationship between the
members and the board in other organizations. The Cleveland Develop-
ment Foundation and the Greater Cleveland Growth Association co-
ordinate their activities by substantially identical executive committees
without any particular effort being made to make the boards of trustees
the same.
A further coordination of activities can be achieved through identity
of executive personnel. The Cleveland Governmental Research Institute,
for example, was founded in 1945 by the board of The Citizens League
of Cleveland as a research organization eligible for charitable contri-
butions. The same person has served as executive director of both
organizations, and offices are shared. No other overlap or control exists
between the organizations, but close cooperation and coordination does
result. Joint appointment of an executive is often the first feasible step
toward an ultimate combination of enterprises.
Control, or influence, through the purse strings is another often used
technique. This is not control in any formal sense, but the greater the
dependence on a source of funds the greater the actual control which
results. The Welfare Federation of Cleveland is such an organization.
It can issue no orders to Red Feather agencies, but by controlling what
may be half or more of an agency's income its influence is great. So
also for the Greater Cleveland Neighborhood Centers Association and
its seventeen member settlement houses like Goodrich, Alta, Merrick,
League Park and Phillis Wheatley.
The final, and ultimate, control mechanism of the foundation or non-
profit corporation is the power to change its charter and by-laws (or
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regulations), including changing the size or composition of its board of
trustees and causing its dissolution. These powers, normally assigned to
"members," represent the power to control the long-term destiny of an
organization. Just as Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed packing the
Supreme Court, power over a foundation can be shifted by enlarging
its board through addition of enough trustees to change control. And as
a last resort those with power over the basic form of an organization can
compel dissolution.
In many respects relationships among foundations and other non-
profit corporations are more complicated and varied than among busi-
ness corporations. In the absence of stock ownership as the major
element of control man's ingenuity has created a host of other devices.
The planner of any non-profit venture can benefit from knowledge of the
possibilities and some of their consequences. This article makes no effort
to be comprehensive. It is little more than the observations of one who
for twenty years has been heavily involved with many of Cleveland's
non-profit enterprises.
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